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THE LAUTSI DECISION AS SEEN FROM 
(CHRISTIAN) EUROPE 
Pierre-Henri Prélot* 
It is a very interesting, as well as a strange, situation for the French to 
comment on behalf of the Americans on the Lautsi case, especially the decisive 
pleading of Joseph Weiler in the Grand Chamber of the European Court in 2011.  
French people heard about Joseph Weiler a few years ago in 2009 when he 
published:  “L’Europe Chrétienne?: Une Excursion” (Christian Europe? : An 
Excursion).  The book was prefaced by the French (Catholic) philosopher Remi 
Brague.  The French edition had been translated from its 2003 Italian version.  
There is no English edition of it.  Such a lacking may seem strange, but the fact is 
that it is not an American Professor educating Americans about Europe, it is an 
essay written for Europeans at the time of the framing of the dead-born “European 
constitutional treaty” by a Jewish law professor who has exhibited complex 
identity and is deeply rooted in European culture. French or European, the music of 
the essay sounded very clear to us.  However, Joseph Weiler failed in his attempt to 
convince the European framers that they should mention the Christian roots of 
Europe in the Preamble of their Constitution.  He failed, but a couple of years later 
the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights accepted that 
crucifixes stay hanging on the walls of Italian classrooms, and there is undoubtedly 
a close connection between these two events.  
As seen from France, the First Section decision in the Lautsi case that was 
stated in 20091 was welcomed by most people as true evidence.  The assertions of 
the Second Chamber were congruent with the French republican conception of 
laïcité, (secularism) as the Court said (§ 56):  
The State has a duty to uphold confessional neutrality in public education, where 
school attendance is compulsory regardless of religion, and which must seek to 
inculcate in pupils the habit of critical thought. 
The Court cannot see how the display in state-school classrooms of a symbol that 
it is reasonable to associate with Catholicism (the majority religion in Italy) could 
serve the educational pluralism which is essential for the preservation of 
“democratic society” within the Convention meaning of that term.  It notes in that 
connection that the (Italian) Constitutional Court's case-law also takes that view.  
Furthermore, the decision was unanimous:  even the Italian judge Zagrebelsky 
approved it.  
On the contrary, the decision of the Grand Chamber in 2011 was mostly 
understood as a capitulation of the European court to Christian European lobbies.  
It might be interesting to explain the reasons for such a harsh criticism, and deliver 
a commentary of the Lautsi decision from a French legal point of view, but 
everybody already knows the answer, which is held in the single word laïcité.  
One must remember that in France the secular republican program under the 
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 1. ECHR, 3 November 2009. 
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third Republic started with school twenty-five years before the separation of State 
and Churches in 1905.  Religious signs have been removed from public schools in 
the early 1880’s and today hanging a crucifix on a school wall would be a serious 
blaspheme.  Of course, Italy is not France, but the French conception of laïcité is 
paradigmatic.  For the French, the absolute visual neutrality and the religious 
blindness of the public sphere, especially in public schools where young children 
from all origins have to live together, is the only way to respect the convictions of 
everybody, believer or non-believer.  Rather than presenting French common 
opinion regarding the Lautsi case, I will try to interpret it in light of arguments that 
Joseph Weiler developed in his book, “L’europe chrétienne,”  as I would do if I 
had to explain to my French students why the European Court ruled that way.  
I will develop two points that seem essential to me and which were raised in 
both the Lautsi case as well as in Joseph Weiler’s book.  The first one is 
substantive: the legal status of religions in European States.  The second one is both 
structural and conceptual: the meaning of Europe.  
I.  RELIGIONS IN EUROPEAN STATES 
The matter of principle that was at stake in the Lautsi case is the following:  
what are the means for a State to grant freedom of consciousness—or if you prefer, 
freedom of religion in its both negative and positive sense—to all its citizens in the 
frame of a pluralistic society, such as European societies have all become today in 
greater or lesser proportion.  Reading the Section Lautsi decision we notice that 
there is a conceptual model, which is secularism or laïcité of State, prescribing, like 
in France or the United States, that public authorities maintain a position of 
distance from all religious convictions.  The State is defined in its Constitution as 
non-religious, or a-religious, or secular-laïc.  For example, article 1 of French 
Constitution states, “France shall be an indivisible, secular (laïque), democratic and 
social Republic.”  But reading the second Lautsi case we see that there is also a 
pragmatic model that guarantees freedom of and from religion within the frame of 
a State that continues to express its cultural and religious ethos inherited from its 
history:  Anglicanism in England, Lutheranism in Denmark or Norway, 
Catholicism in Spain, Italy, or Austria, Orthodoxy in Eastern Europe.  Of course 
there is a tension between these two conceptual models, otherwise the Lautsi case 
would not be discussed as it is.  
Let us say a word about the French secular model.  It is a legacy of the 
revolutionary times.  When sovereignty moved from the Monarch by divine right to 
the Nation, the new State had to define its religious identity, and it ceased to 
understand itself as Catholic.  The process was directly linked to the new 
conception of citizenship that was defined independently of any religious 
membership.  Religion had become a single opinion, as says the Declaration of 
Human and Civic Rights (article 10), it was not any more a matter of status, of 
belonging, or affiliation. 
In that sense the origins of French secular tradition are basically political. 
Secularism in France is much more than a process to regulate religious pluralism.  
It is part of the French concept of citizenship, a concept that expels religion from 
the common public sphere.  It may be intolerant in a way, but we also have to 
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remember that it is the way Protestants and Jews became full French citizens two 
hundred years ago.  If there must be a European citizenship, don’t ask the French 
people to conceive it differently from what citizenship means for them. 
The decision of the Great Chamber in the Lautsi case echoes in a large way 
Joseph’s Weiler argument in his pleading.  One of the most important passages of 
the decision is the following (§ 74):  
According to the indications provided by the Government, Italy opens up the 
school environment in parallel to other religions.  The Government indicated in 
this connection that it was not forbidden for pupils to wear Islamic headscarves or 
other symbols or apparel having a religious connotation; alternative arrangements 
were possible to help schooling fit in with non-majority religious practices; the 
beginning and end of Ramadan were “often celebrated” in schools; and optional 
religious education could be organised [sic] in schools for “all recognised [sic] 
religious creeds.  Moreover, there was nothing to suggest that the authorities were 
intolerant of pupils who believed in other religions, were non-believers or who 
held non-religious philosophical convictions.  
We will not discuss the reality of those “indications provided by the 
government,” though many Italians contested an unrealistic sugar-coated 
description of Italian public schools.  The fact is that for the Grand Chamber, 
Italian authorities have not been intolerant.  
Tolerance in fact is the key-word.  It is a word that also belongs to French 
national history.  Four centuries ago, in 1598, the French predecessors of Professor 
Weiler would have been the legists who drafted the Edict of Nantes, also called 
Edict of tolerance. The French Edict of tolerance recognized the right for 
Protestants to practice their religion freely in the French Catholic kingdom.  It 
established that they would never be constrained to act against their consciousness 
for matters of religion.2  It is the Edict of Nantes that restored peace in France after 
decades of deadly civil war.  The Edict was suppressed in 1685 by Louis XIV, who 
reestablished the religious unity of the Kingdom, according to the epochal political 
principle Cujus regio ejus religio.  Toleration was no longer tolerable.  More than 
200,000 Protestants had to leave France.  In 1789, some priests proposed to restore 
tolerance but it was too late.  The revolutionaries preferred to nationalize the Old 
unitary Catholic matrix.  We the French should remember our story, it teaches us 
that we have not always been what we are today.   
The Lautsi case is a good illustration of the dualism of European countries in 
the fields of religion.  The aim of tolerance is pacification through diversity, 
whereas the aim of secularism is unity through integration.  So if you feel deeply 
faithful you may prefer to live in a country of pluralism that grants a more 
complete freedom of public behavior even if you belong to a minority and have to 
support the predominance of an established religion.  
                                                                                                     
 2. Article VI:  Et pour ne laisser aucune occasion de troubles et différends entre nos sujets, avons 
permis et permettons à ceux de ladite religion prétendue réformée vivre et demeurer par toutes les villes 
et lieux de cestui notre royaume et pays de notre obéissance, sans être enquis, vexés, molestés ni 
astreints à faire chose pour le fait de la religion contre leur conscience, ni pour raison d'icelle être 
recherchés dans les maisons et lieux où ils voudront habiter, en se comportant au reste selon qu'il est 
contenu en notre présent Édit. 
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II.  THE LAUTSI CASE IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT 
The question that the Lautsi case had to answer was whether both models 
(secularism and tolerance) can coexist in Europe or not.  As Joseph Weiler 
suggests, Europe, unlike a federal nation like the United States, is not composed of 
a single people, but of twenty-seven (or forty-seven) different peoples.  Europe is 
“a people of others” as he says, and as long as it will be so, national identities have 
to be respected.  This is the structural reason why the Grand Chamber decided to 
reverse the Section decision.  I quote (§ 68):  
The Court takes the view that the decision whether or not to perpetuate a tradition 
falls in principle within the margin of appreciation of the respondent State.  The 
Court must moreover take into account the fact that Europe is marked by a great 
diversity between the States of which it is composed, particularly in the sphere of 
cultural and historical development. 
This does not mean that French secularism is contrary to article 9 and freedom 
of religion.  The Great Chamber merely said that from the moment a State respects 
the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention it is free to refer to its 
religious tradition.  As far as France is concerned, from the moment it ratified the 
Convention until today, France has been condemned only one time for violation of 
article 9—freedom of religion (30 June 2011, Case of Jehovah Witnesses, tax 
affair).  On the contrary, if the first Lautsi decision had not been cancelled, all the 
States would have been obliged to follow the French secular model, and suppress 
all signs of religious identity as non-neutral.  When Joseph Weiler raised the 
specter of an Americanization of European society, he referred mainly to the 
federal contexts of both Europe and America, considering that the substance of the 
separation principle is very different in France from what it is in America.  The aim 
of separation in France is to protect the State—and the individuals—from religions; 
the aim of separation in America is to protect freedom of religions through a strict 
equality.   
In the Lautsi affair, the Strasbourg Court refused to impose neutrality of the 
public sphere as the only way to protect freedom of and from religion within the 
European sphere.  It did not condemn the French secular model, but it clearly said 
that it is and will remain a national model because there is no European model, and 
this is why it raised such criticisms in a country that has always understood itself as 
a light in the fields of Human rights.  As said Saint Just at the revolutionary time, 
“the French people proclaim the freedom of the world.”  But there is something 
more in this decision, something that has to do with the identity of Europe and its 
“Christian roots.”  When the Grand Chamber gathered in 2011, its session was 
something more than the ordinary audience of a Court. Leave to intervene in the 
(written and/or oral) procedure was given to thirty-three members of the European 
Parliament acting collectively, to eight non-governmental organizations from both 
secular and Christian sides,3 and also to the Governments of ten States,4 among 
                                                                                                     
 3. Including the Semaines sociales de France, a French organ of social Catholicism created in the 
aftermath of the Encyclical Rerum novarum. 
 4. Armenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Russian Federation, Greece, Lithuania, Malta, Monaco, 
Romania and the Republic of San Marino 
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which six are members of the European Union.  The procedure went far beyond the 
Italian case and the question of right to education; it dealt no more or no less with 
the place of Christianity (whose central logo is the crucifix) in the identity of 
Europe itself.  Considering that all member States of the European Union are also 
parties to the European Convention, and that the Union itself (Article 6 of the 
European Treaty) shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, we may suggest that the European 
Court acted as a kind of judiciary Convention that implicitly acknowledged in its 
decision the Christian roots of Europe and the right for its member countries to 
make them part of their current identity.  The European Court has in fact 
reintroduced Christianity in the substantive provisions of European 
Constitutionalism, and it is also why the Lautsi decision was given such a bad 
reception in France.  This is why Christian Europe owes much to Joseph Weiler.  
 
